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with Secy.

1- "Military
Naval
Policy
2- Bureau
3- S/P chr.

TOP SECRET

November 25, 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY

Subject: Oral Presentation of the
Annual Report of the Net
Evaluation Subcommittee

1. I understand that you will receive the same briefing given last week to the President and to the NSC.

2. I submit the following observations based on my hearing this briefing and asking a few questions last week in the Pentagon.

a. The claim that SAC plans to over-destroy targets seems to be borne out. For example, I understand that the assumptions used in this study in regard to target Moscow called for weapons having a total explosive yield of 100 megatons, of which some 66 megatons are assumed to have actually reached the target. For comparison, 100 megatons is the explosive equivalent of 5,000 Hiroshima-type bombs. I was advised that the study assumed that Moscow would be hit by IRBMs, fleet ballistic missiles, air-to-surface missiles, and ICBMs before being hit by SAC airplane delivered bombs. You may wish to address some questions to this point.

b. You will note that the study assumes a destruction of targets throughout China. I believe that this was based on an assumption that the North Koreans had attacked the South Koreans.

3. You will note the heavy fatalities from fall-out. This will not be limited to the Soviet Union and China. Leaving aside the question of the

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morality of this type of general destruction of the Soviet Union, I have serious doubts as to the morality of a retaliation against the Soviet Union which would have serious effects on non-belligerent nations.

4. We used to be advised that a doctrine of "restraint" governed the planning of our strategic bombing operations. It is difficult to see any fruits of any such doctrine in this briefing.

Gerard C. Smith

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Authority NAD 949671
 By MB NARA Date 10/27/98

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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Mr. Gracie	S/AS	4207	NS
Mr. Valtieri	WE	5227	NS

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Subject: Report on Visit to Jupiter Sites in Italy,
 dated September 18

I thought you might like to see these rough notes
 of my trip to the Italian Jupiter Sites.

J. Taylor

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FROM (NAME AND ORGANIZATION)	ROOM NO. AND BLDG.
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Copies, Series 1SECRET

Rome

September 18, 1961

REPORT ON VISIT TO JUPITER SITES IN ITALY

I spent the day on September 15 at Gioia del Colle, the main base of the two Italian Jupiter squadrons, which is some 40 minutes ride by car from Bari. Gioia is the center of the Jupiter complex. At Gioia, a former, small NATO airfield, is the headquarters of the Commander, Brigadier General Grassiani, and the Vice Commander, a US Air Force Colonel. Here the maintenance is performed on the missiles, weapons and missiles received and shipped out. The Command Post is also here. There is a long but narrow airstrip which is used regularly but infrequently. At the Gioia base are also the US and Italian administrative facilities, Italian housing, US (newly constructed) support facilities, commissary and the like. The US support facilities are not now being used, at the request of the Italian Government; until the US element phases down our people will continue to use the support facilities at Taranto. Then, when the numbers of US personnel have been reduced, the support facilities at Gioia will be used. US personnel are quartered for the most part at Taranto some 50 minutes driving time from Gioia. As Rome has reported, the Air Force wishes to build housing at Gioia for Americans and their families to ease some of the strain involved in driving a couple of hours each day and to consolidate US personnel so that in case of emergency they can be reached and assembled promptly.

Radiating out from Gioia at distances ranging from 10 to 30 miles are 10 positions at each of which are sited three Jupiters. Each position except position 1, which is close to Gioia, has a logistic site supporting it. I visited only position 9, but I gather that it is typical of the others. Some are on little hills, others in open fields, one is very close to the rail line, many quite near and visible from the road. Trees grow fairly close to most positions although there has been some thinning out since last fall. Carabinieri sporadically patrol the wood and fields around the positions, but there is no regular patrol outside the double fence. At night the place blazes with light and from the air each position can be clearly spotted and identified.

No warheads are now stored at Gioia; all the warheads are now on the 30 missiles and there are no spares as far as I know. There are, however, facilities for storing warheads at Gioia. I saw the building which is not igloo-shaped but a square concrete structure situated not more than about 200 yards from the airstrip. I am told that it meets NATO criteria as to location, but I imagined that for safety it might have been located farther away from the landing area. When we were at Gioia 3 missiles were not operational due to repairs and other regular maintenance which had to be performed. I assume

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(although I do not know because the site I visited had all three operational) that when a missile must be taken down or removed from the site the warhead is removed and stored temporarily in a concrete blockhouse more or less at the center of each position. At each position there are two US Air Force officers and two US airmen. These teams serve for 48 hours at a stretch and are then relieved. The Officers are Launch Authentication Officers (LAO's) and the enlisted men are warhead custodians. The custodians (only one is on duty at a time) stands at a place where he can observe that the warheads are on the three missiles at all times. That's all he does while the missiles are mated; when they are taken down and the warhead detached he must of course be present at the operation. The Italian units at each position must pull one 8 hour tour in every 24. This gives little flexibility for sickness or leave, and the US has been trying to persuade them to build up so that their teams are 4 rather than 3 deep. An Italian officer of Lt. Colonel or Major rank is in command at each position.

The 10 positions are linked to the command post at Gioia by land lines and microwave. All positions can be given instructions simultaneously. Gioia is connected to SHAPE by land circuits as well as radio. According to US officers, communications are not a serious problem, at least on their end of the line. They get their instructions for launching from SHAPE, of course, but if SHAPE were knocked out AFSOUTH could transmit orders. One and a half minutes after the order to launch has been received at Headquarters at Gioia instructions to start the countdown can be communicated to positions. All operational missiles are expected to be capable of launch after a 15 minute countdown. However, the US Deputy Commander estimated that only 60% of his operational missiles could get off within the 15 minute countdown; 20% within another 15 minutes; and the rest, who knows?

When the order to launch is transmitted to the positions, the Italian Launch Authentication Officer inserts a key which starts the launch procedure. Just before the countdown is completed the US officer inserts and turns a key. The key is not worn around his neck but is held in a safe in the Launch Control Trailer. The US officers stressed that the US launch key is not the only control we have over unauthorized launch. Even if the US LAO were overpowered and the key taken from him, there are any number of things that could be done outside the trailer to hold the missile from launch -- cut off liquid oxygen, fuel, power etc. For technical support the Italians are now heavily dependent on us. Target data which held by the US at the Command Post at Gioia could also be withheld. Further, the Italians are not, in the opinion of the US officers at Gioia, capable of laying the missile, although perhaps in time they might develop this capability.

Miscellaneous

The production of sufficient quantities of liquid oxygen to keep the fuel supply of each missile high enough to permit launch within 15 minutes is the major operational problem. The US officers think they have it licked, however, having brought into operation a 25 ton LOX plant just last week.

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Housing, as I noted above is of critical importance. US personnel are scattered around the countryside, although generally concentrated in Taranto. Only one officer beside the US Vice Commander can be reached by telephone in Taranto, so they have devised a runner system. To assemble the essential numbers of US personnel to cope with an emergency or an alert would require some hours. It seems pretty important to have housing for officers and enlisted men and their families at the base at Giccia. As the Embassy points out in a recent despatch, it is essential if the USAF builds housing for our people at Giccia that we discharge an obligation the Italians believe we washed on two years ago and build housing for them too. Some, but only about half of the required Italian family housing, is now available on the base.


Italian personnel shortages in the lower officer echelons and enlisted ranks are a serious problem. The Commander, Grassiani, got full marks from the US officers. He apparently has drive and conviction and is doing an able job. He is assisted by able officers too. Italian instructors are considered proficient and some rank with our own. However, the missile game is not too appealing to very many Italian officers, who feel that going to Giccia is taking them to exile. Personal and career considerations have both played a part in leading many IAF officers and BN's to conclude that they don't want to stay in missilery. Then too there is a severe shortage of personnel who possess the capability to learn the game. As has been noted to me, the IAF has spread itself pretty thin, what with its participation in programs for Jupiters, MIKE's and F-105's.

144-b - I was told that no RD has yet been passed to the Italians, nor has the US detachment instructions to communicate any. As far as the US element was concerned, the 144b agreement would make very little difference to the operational capability of the Italians. It would be a little more convenient if the Italians were able to assist in the mating and demating of the warhead and it would be useful to have them in a position where they could perform some of the US functions in case of an emergency or accident. In the absence of the authority to transmit RD, the US element has not been able to confirm or deny to the Italians the presence of US nuclear warheads at Giccia. This is of course an anomalous situation because the Italians clearly know that they are there - this comes out during movement, in event of accidents, or preparation for handling nuclear accidents. I have no idea whether withholding this information rankles in the Italians; they have said nothing about it to USAF officers.

Secrecy - It clearly makes no sense to continue to classify the existence of the Jupiters and their location, but the Italian Government seems to want it that way for political reasons. When the Foreign Office granted permission for me and Senator Pastore and Congressman Price to visit Giccia, they stressed that permission was given on condition that there be no publicity.

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Security - The Italian guards take their responsibilities very seriously. I would say that the mere act of guarding is well performed. However, the missiles remain vulnerable to sabotage. It is possible, although not too likely in view of more intensive Carabinieri activity in the adjacent areas, that a saboteur could bust the skin of one of the birds with a rifle. A fast small plane too might be able to get in and take one or two out. There are no NIKS or other air defenses in the immediate vicinity. (However, there appear to be some on the coast.) I have no idea what the degree of probability is that this might happen. The dispersal of the ten positions certainly makes less likely that critical damage could be done to so many of the birds by sabotage as to seriously affect the capability of the brigade to carry out its mission. For saboteurs to hit all ten positions would require activity by a substantial number of people which the Carabinieri might well detect. Further, sabotage is more likely to occur, I assume, at a time of great tension when the enemy fears or suspects that we might launch the birds. During such periods the Carabinieri would surely be increased, the area well patrolled and air cover provided. In brief, our people and the Italians are taking something of a risk by putting the positions where they are, but it is a calculated one and may not be so serious in terms of affecting the essential utility of the Jupiters as we have come to imagine.

The Jupiter as a System - I think they are better than nothing at this time. As some people here have pointed out, they do draw off a part of the Soviet missile force which must cover them. How substantial that force is I don't have any idea but the 30 Jupiters are widely scattered and I would imagine that something like a similar number of Russian missiles would be tied down by the Jupiters at Gioia. The Embassy still has the shakes from the Department's telegram which raised the possibility of cancelling the Jupiter program for Italy. The Italians have made a hard decision and we have to be very careful how or when we back away from the Jupiter program.

Alan G. James

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